Juni 2009 markerte den hittil største motstanden mot presteregimet i Teheran. Den unge kvinnen Nedas død har blitt stående som YouTube-ikonet for motstandskampen og brutaliteten som ble brukt for å slå den ned.
Midtøsten er i omveltning. I Tunisia og Egypt er regimeskiftene et faktum. Syria, Libya og Jemen koker. Enn så lenge kan det virke som ayatollahene sitter trygt i Iran. Var «de grønnes» opprør forgjeves?
Ramin Jahanbegloo, en iransk opposisjonell i eksil, nekter å akseptere at bevegelsen feilet:
[T]he Green Movement has achieved its goal by gaining the moral high ground, revealing to the world the true face of the Islamic regime, and draining away much of its political legitimacy. Further, it has hastened the end of Khomeinism by exposing the existent political rifts within the Iranian political power.
Maryam Sinaiee siterer den grønne aktivisten Ali Alizadeh:
The problem with the movement is not the incarceration of the figures considered as the leaders of the movement, but rather its voluntary self-limitation of demands and tactics, its lack of long-term strategy … and its failure to produce a momentum around the incarceration of its symbolic representatives.
Yasaman Baji rapporterer at bevegelsen står låst i et strategisk dilemma:
The larger dilemma at this point for the Green movement, according to an Iranian political analyst who asked to remain anonymous out of fear of reprisal, is that intra-conservative conflicts are beneficial to the Greens, but lack of action could weaken the movement.
Conn Hallinan holder et øye på økonomien:
[T]he economic situation is inherently unstable. So far the government has managed to keep unrest under control by cash outlays and forcing the merchant class—many of whom support the Green opposition—to keep prices artificially low. This forces many merchants to operate at a loss. «Eventually prices will have to be allowed to float,» says Poorzad, «and when that happens inflation will go up sharply.»
David Rosenberg advarte forrige måned om utenrikspolitiske implikasjoner:
Right now, the battle is confined to the corridors of power in Tehran. But analysts say it could eventually manifest itself in a more aggressive foreign policy as Ahmadinejad tries to demonstrate his independence and score points with popular opinion.
The fact is that in spite of Arab unrest and the optimism of the Iranian ruling faction, they have not yet accrued a single tangible, strategic or stable benefit from these uprisings.